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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTI CE 
Name: Miller, Michael Facility: Marcy CF 
NYSJD 
DIN: 14-B-3113 
Appearances: 
Decision appealed: 
Final Revocation 
Hearing Date: 
Papers considered: 
Appeals Unit 
Review: 
Records relied upon: 
Appeal Control No.: 06-146-18 R 
Craig P. Schlanger. Esq. 
Hiscock Legal Aid Society 
351 South Warren Street 
Syracuse, NY 13202 
June 11, 2018 revocation of release and imposition of a· time assessment of hold to 
maximum expiration. 
May 22, 2018 
Appellant's Letter-brief received December 5, 2018 
Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Notice of Violation, Violation of Release Report, Final Hearing Transcript, Parole 
Revocation :O~cjsiQq -Notice 
i: : . : t ~~ . - ' 
The undersig1wd de~rmine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~ed _ ~eversed, remanded for de novo hearing _Reversed, violation vacated 
_ Vacated for de novo review of time assessment only Modified to ____ _ 
~rmed .. ; _. _Reversed, remanded for de novo hearing _Reversed, violation vacated 
_ Vacated for de novo review of time assessment only ,,, 
_·_Modified to ____ _ 
~rmed _Reversed, remanded .for de novo hearing _Reversed, violation vacated 
_Vacated for .de novo review of time assessment only Modified to ____ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit' s Findings and the separa~e finjlings o~ 
the Parole Board~ if any, were mailed .to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on _j.i;J;J,//'7 ,ft,. 
. I ' 
'!-• ·, I I ! . 
" ' •' . . 
!'I ' ,I ' ·.1: • . ,, 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - lust. Parole File - Central File 
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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Miller, Michael DIN: 14-B-3113 
Facility: Marcy CF AC No.:  06-146-18 R 
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Appellant challenges the June 11, 2018 determination of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”), 
revoking release and imposing a hold to maximum expiration-month time assessment. Appellant 
contends that the finding that he had violated his conditions of release in an important respect was 
not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellant further argues that the time 
assessment imposed was excessive. 
 
To sustain a violation charge, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) must conclude that the 
parolee’s conduct constituted a violation of the cited condition “in an important respect.”  
Executive Law § 259-i(3)(f)(x); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 8005.19(e), 8005.20(b).   The conclusion must 
be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.  Executive Law § 259-i(3)(f)(viii); 9 NYCRR 
8005.19(e); Matter of Davis v. Laclair, 165 A.D.3d 1367, 1368, 85 N.Y.S.3d 623 (3d Dept. 2018).  
 
The formal rules of evidence observed by courts do not apply to parole revocation proceedings.  9 
NYCRR 8005.2(a); Matter of Currie v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 298 A.D.2d 805, 806, 748 
N.Y.S.2d 712 (3d Dept. 2002); Matter of Morton v. State, 292 A.D.2d 696, 739 N.Y.S.2d 218 (3d 
Dept.), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 606, 746 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2002).  Thus, hearsay is admissible in a 
parole revocation proceeding and may be the basis of a determination.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8005.2; 
Matter of Williams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 225 A.D.2d 490, 491, 639 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1st 
Dept.), lv. denied, 88 N.Y.2d 810, 649 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1996) 
 
Appellant’s first contention, that a preponderance of the evidence did not support the finding that 
he violated Rule 8 of his conditions of release by assaulting his paramour, resulting in her injury 
and his subsequent arrest on criminal charges, is without merit. The finding of the ALJ was 
supported by: the violation papers; the testimony of appellant’s neighbor, who heard an altercation 
between appellant and the victim and had previously witnessed the victim with an injured nose; 
the testimony of the police officer who brought the victim  
 after the incident who described the victim’s injuries as well as her 
statement to him that appellant had assaulted her because she refused to engage in anal intercourse.    
 
Although the victim, appellant’s paramour, recanted her earlier statement describing an assault by 
appellant and testified at the final revocation hearing that the struggle heard by appellant’s 
neighbor was one in which she attacked appellant, and provided alternate explanations for her 
injuries, namely that she threw a basketball at appellant, which rebounding into her face, and that 
her eye injury was due to a fall, this testimony was not credited by the ALJ.  Although appellant 
argues that the ALJ should have credited this recantation, the resolution of credibility issues is a 
matter for the hearing officer’s discretion. See Matter of Gainey v. Stanford, 157 A.D.3d 1176, 70 
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N.Y.S.3d 589 (3d Dept. 2018); Osman v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 628, 26 N.Y.S.3d 852 (1st Dept. 
2016). 
 
Appellant’s second contention, that a preponderance of the evidence did not support the finding 
that he violated the special condition of release prohibiting contact with his paramour outside of 
curfew hours, is without merit. This finding was supported by the testimony of appellant’s parole 
officer that the paramour was present, in pajamas, during a home visit after curfew at 10:30 P.M.  
Contrary to appellant’s contention, there is no basis to treat ambiguity about the meaning of “fully 
dressed” as an indication that the parole officer contradicted himself by describing the paramour 
as “fully dressed” and then “fully dressed in pajamas”. In any event, it was within the discretion 
of the ALJ to credit this testimony as she did. See Matter of Gainey v. Stanford, 157 A.D.3d 1176, 
70 N.Y.S.3d 589 (3d Dept. 2018); Osman v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 628, 26 N.Y.S.3d 852 (1st Dept. 
2016). 
 
Appellant’s challenge to the time assessment imposed by the ALJ as excessive is without merit.  
Although the time assessment for a category 1 violator such as Appellant generally must be a 
minimum of 15 months or a hold to the maximum expiration of the sentence (9 NYCRR. 
8005.20[c][1]), the Executive Law does not place an outer limit on the length of time that may be 
imposed.  Matter of Washington v. Annucci, 144 A.D.3d 1541, 41 N.Y.S.3d 808 (4th Dept. 2016); 
Matter of Wilson v. Evans, 104 A.D.3d 1190, 1191, 960 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (4th Dept. 2013); 
Murchison v. New York State Div. of Parole, 91 A.D.3d 1005, 1005, 935 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (3d 
Dept. 2012).   
 
Thus, in light of appellant’s criminal history and repeated violations of the conditions of release a 
hold to maximum expiration was within the authority of the ALJ. See Matter of Rosa v. Fischer, 
108 A.D.3d 1227, 1228, 969 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (4th Dept. 2013) lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 855, 979 
N.Y.S.2d 561, (2013). 
Consequently, appellant’s challenges to the determination of the ALJ are without merit. The 
determination was supported by a preponderance of evidence and the time assessment imposed 
was not improper. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
